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Abstract
A popular approach of achieving fairness in optimization problems is by
constraining the solution space to “fair” solutions, which unfortunately typi-
cally reduces solution quality. In practice, the ultimate goal is often an aggre-
gate of sub-goals without a unique or best way of combining them or which
is otherwise only partially known. I turn this problem into a feature and
suggest to use a parametrized objective and vary the parameters within rea-
sonable ranges to get a set of optimal solutions, which can then be optimized
using secondary criteria such as fairness without compromising the primary
objective, i.e. without regret (societal cost).
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∗Regret is meant here in a mathematical sense, and fairness could be replaced by various other
criteria.
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1 Introduction
We consider the problem of optimizing a primary objective while also caring about
a second criterion. Before introducing our model, we need to clarify terminol-
ogy: The words “(sub)optimal”, “best”, “solution quality”, “regret”, “(ir)relevant”,
“(in)comparable” will always refer to the primary objective, henceforth called “ob-
jective”. On the other hand, “fair”, “just”, “equitable” will always refer to the
secondary criterion. If some of the latter aspects are relevant to the primary ob-
jective, they should be incorporated there. While in practice there are differences
in meaning of fair/just/equitable and possibly treatment, the difference does not
matter in formalizing our basic idea, so we use the terms interchangeably.
We consider the problem of (automated) decision-making based on some (pri-
mary) objective U : S → R. Optimal solutions s∗ := arg maxs U(s) sometimes
appear to be unfair or unjust or not equitable. A popular approach of achieving
fairness or equality is by constraining the solution space S [ZVRG17, ABD+18].
Sometimes (primary-objective) irrelevant attributes such as gender are used (e.g.
admit the best students, but constrained by selecting at least 30% women). Di-
versity arguments have more force, if based on objective-relevant attributes, e.g.
diversity in thinking or skills, rather than diversity in looks or genes. In the former
case, diversity is (only) an instrumental goal: If diversity indeed improves what-
ever the ultimate goal is, then it could in principle (already) be accounted for in
the to-be-optimized objective, although operationally it may be easier to treat it as
a constraint. If diversity does not positively correlate with the ultimate goal, but
is desirable for other reasons, it can be modeled as a secondary objective or con-
straint. This constraining-of-solution-space by (esp. irrelevant) factors is a popular
approach, which unfortunately reduces solution quality [MW18].1
In practice, the ultimate goal is often a (possibly non-linear) aggregate of sub-
goals, e.g. “life goals” include food, shelter, family, education, entertainment, health,
wealth, ... Few would argue there is a unique or best way of combining the different
sub-goals into one objective.
If we allow for a parametrized2 objective Uθ and vary the parameters θ within
reasonable ranges Θ, we get a set of (incomparable) optimal solutions {s∗θ : θ ∈ Θ},
one s∗θ := arg maxs Uθ(s) for each θ, and can optimize within this set for secondary
criteria such as fairness F : S → R without compromising the primary objective, i.e.
without (societal) cost. The optimal fair solution is s∗θ∗ , where θ
∗ := arg maxθ F (s∗θ).
The next few pages discuss and illustrate this idea a bit more, but hardly go beyond
this basic idea.
I kept this note deliberately simple and focus on the basic idea. No probabilities,
no machine learning, no fancy optimization algorithm – yet. Besides an example,
which is purely for illustration purpose only, I also don’t discuss how objectives or
1In machine learning classification this is known as the Accuracy↔Fairness tradeoff.
2This formulation also covers partially specified, partially observed, and imprecise objectives,
but not stochastic uncertainty.
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fairness criteria could or should be chosen. Whatever practitioners/society/ethicists
deem appropriate, can be plugged in. This work is also not about bias in the data;
it assumes data is unbiased or has been debiased by other means [BS16, CWV+17].
The focus is on how to improve a (given) fairness criterion without compromising
solution quality with respect to some (given) primary objectives, given unbiased
data.
2 Fairness as a Constraint
Optimal unconstrained solution. Consider an optimization problem with so-
lutions space S, and some objective quantified by an utility function U : S → R.
The3
optimal solution (by definition) is s∗ := arg max
s∈S
U(s) (1)
Example. Consider a simple example of student admissions based on IQ and grade.
Assume there is a pool of 6 potential students P ≡ {studenti : 1 ≤ i ≤ 6} applying
with information student = (ID, name, IQ, grade, gender} as displayed in Table 1 and
Figure 1.
Assume that high IQ and grade are deemed equally important for admission to
University. IQ is in the range 80–150 or maybe 50–200 in general, while grades
are in the range 5–10 or in general 0–10, so they are not directly commensurable.
Administrators typically rescale factors to make them commensurable, so dividing
IQ by 10 may be adopted. We thus arrive at a performance measure
U(student) := 1
2
IQ(student)/10 + 1
2
grade(student) ∈ [0; 15]
Assume the University can admit 2 students and A ⊆ P is the set of potentially
admitted students. The goal then is to maximize objective
U(A) :=
∑
student∈A
U(student)
which is the same as selecting the two students with highest U . The by-definition
optimal selection is
A∗ := arg max
A⊆P :|A|=2
U(A) = {student ∈ P : U(student) ≥ u}
for some suitable choice of u such that the condition holds for exactly 2 students.
From the U=U1/2-column in Table 1 one can see that Bob and Zac have the highest
score, i.e. A∗ = {Bob,Zac}.4
3We assume finite S and bounded U to avoid distracting math subtleties.
4To connect the notation back to (1), set s := A and S = {A ⊆ P : |A| = 2}, then s∗ = A∗.
See also Figure 2.
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Table 1: (Student data&score) There are 6 students in our running example P ,
together with their θ-weighted score Uθ := θ·IQ/10 + (1−θ)·grade for various θ.
ID name IQ grade gender U = U1/2 U0.35 U0.2
A Amy 100 10 f 10 10 10
B Bob 150 7 m 11 9.8 8.6
E Eve 150 5 f 10 8.5 7.0
I Isa 110 9 f 10 9.7 9.4
M Max 70 9 m 8 8.3 8.6
Z Zac 140 8 m 11 10.1 9.2
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Figure 1: (Student example) 6 students from P with IQ/grade on horizon-
tal/vertical axis.
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Figure 2: (Student pairs) All 15 pairs of students (all potential admissions
A ⊆ P : |A| = 2) with summed IQ/grade on horizontal/vertical axis, labeled with
name initials.
4
Classical fairness constraint. In the example, the average IQ and grade of men
is the same as for women, namely 〈IQ|m〉 = 120 = 〈IQ|f〉 and 〈grade|m〉 = 8 =
〈grade|f〉. Arguably admitting two men in this situation is unfair.5 Quotas have
been argued to increase fairness, e.g. admit at least 30% women. Formally one
restricts the solution space S to fair solutions Sfair := {s ∈ S : F (s) = fair}, where
F : S → {unfair, fair} is some (exact/hard) fairness constraint, leading to the
optimal fair solution s∗fair := arg max
s∈Sfair
U(s) (2)
Example. In the student admission example, one could set F (A) := fair iff A
contains more than 30% women, in which case A∗fair consists of Bob or Zac and Amy or
Eve or Isa. All 6 solutions score the same U(A∗fair) = 21 but less than U(A
∗) = 22. In
general, the constrained optimum s∗fair is sub-optimal compared to the unconstrained
optimal solution s∗. Fairness comes with a cost or regret of U(s∗) − U(s∗fair) > 0
(unless s∗fair = s
∗). In the example, 10 IQ-points or 1 in grade is sacrificed.
3 Fairness without Regret
Uncertain objective. The considered admission protocol involved a number of
not-so-well justified steps. For instance, IQ and grade were weighed equally, but what
if overall student grade is refined to STEM grade and HASS grade, then weighing
IQ:STEM:HASS as 1:1:1 may be more natural, effectively weighing IQ by 1
3
and
grade by 2
3
. Equally concerning is the adopted rescaling to make IQ and grade
commensurable. The chosen scaling was plausible but by far unique. Dividing IQ
by 20 to get IQ and grade into the same range 0 – 10 seems equally justified. While
sophisticated analyzes or deliberations may narrow down the choices, in many social
real-world problems, a considerable degree of freedom or uncertainty in the objective
remains.
Core Idea: Fairness without Regret. The main idea of this note is to actually
turn this problem into a feature, enabling fairer decision making without regret:
If a unique objective is not achievable, consider the class of reasonable objective
functions, or at least a sub-class thereof, say {Uθ : θ ∈ Θ}. Each choice θ ∈ Θ leads
to a potentially different
θ-optimal solution s∗θ := arg max
s∈S
Uθ(s) (3)
Since (by assumption) no objective among {Uθ} is more justified than another, Uθ-
optimal solutions s∗θ are incomparable. We hence can use some secondary criterion
5This is neither the place for such argument, nor what term, fair↔just↔equitable, is most
appropriate.
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F : S → R to choose among the Uθ-optimal solutions S∗Θ := {s∗θ : θ ∈ Θ} without
regret, e.g. the fairest solution:
s∗θ∗ = arg max
s∈S∗Θ
F (s) (with θ∗ := arg max
θ∈Θ
F (s∗θ) ) (4)
is (the parameter corresponding to) the maximally fair solution among optimal
solutions s∗θ.
Example. In our example, we could introduce a parameter weighing IQ versus
grade:
Uθ(student) := θ·IQ(student)/10 + (1−θ)·grade(student) with 13 ≤ θ ≤ 23
We definitely want to take IQ and grade into account, so θ should not be close to
0 or 1. A range 1
3
≤ θ ≤ 2
3
may be deemed plausible. A smaller range seems too
dogmatic while a much larger range risks to focus too much on one attribute. The
Uθ-optimal admissions then are
A∗θ := arg max
A⊆P :|A|=2
Uθ(A) = {student ∈ P : Uθ(student) ≥ uθ}
As a (soft/approximate) fairness criterion we could measure the male-female number
mismatch
−F (A) :=
∣∣∣#{student ∈ A : gender(student) = m}
− #{student ∈ A : gender(student) = f}
∣∣∣
Table 1 shows Uθ for θ =
1/2 and θ = 0.35 and the out-of-range θ = 0.2. −F (A)
is minimized if the number of male and female admissions is the same. For θ = 0.35,
Aθ = {Amy,Zac} achieves this, while our original objective U = U1/2 does not. Hence
the optimal fair solution is A∗θ∗ = {Amy,Zac} achieved by reducing the weight of IQ
a bit to e.g. 0.35 = θ∗ ∈ arg maxθ F (A∗θ).
More generally one can show (most conveniently by inspecting Figure 2) that
3/8<θ<
3/4 admits two men,
1/4<θ
∗< 3/8 admits one male and one female, and θ< 1/4
would admit two women, but this has been deemed out-of-range, so no fairness
criterion could achieve this, unless Θ is enlarged.
Note that U0.35(A
∗
0.35) = 20.1 while U1/2(A
∗
1/2
) = U(A∗) = 22. This does not
imply that the fair solution is inferior to the original unconstrained solution. Uθ(A)
for different θ are incomparable (even on the same A). Indeed, in general, the fair
utility Uθ∗(s
∗
θ∗) may even be higher than the original U(s
∗) (assuming ∃θ : U = Uθ).
For instance, this would happen if we added an (otherwise irrelevant) large positive
constant to all grades, or if we apply an (otherwise irrelevant) transformation fθ to
Uθ, e.g. using U˜θ := (1−θ)·Uθ.
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4 The Optimization Problem
A naive gradient ascent algorithm. In order to obtain an optimal fair solution
s∗θ∗ or A
∗
θ∗ , one has to solve the coupled optimization problems (3) and (4). In
general, this is a nasty non-convex and non-continuous double-optimization problem
over discrete choices (s ∈ S or A ⊆ P ) and continuous parameters (θ ∈ Θ). Off-
the-shelf general-purpose optimization algorithms may work sometimes. Possibly
special-purpose optimizers have to be developed for large-scale real-world problems.
In case of a continuous solution space S ⊆ Rd′ and continuous parameter space
Θ ⊆ Rd and (twice) continuously differentiable Uθ(s) and F (s), we could try to
incrementally improve both by gradient ascent: Assume first, we solve (3) exactly,
and want to improve fairness F (s∗θ) by updating θ in direction of
6
∇θF (arg max
s
Uθ(s)) ≡ ∇θF (s∗θ) =: Gθ(s∗θ)
An explicit expression for G can be obtained by implicit differentiation [FAHG16,
Lem.1&2]7
Gθ(s) = −∇θ∇>s Uθ(s) · [∇s∇>s Uθ(s)]−1 · ∇sF (s)
Starting with some (s,θ), for this fixed θ, we could now improve s by either solving
maximization (3) exactly for s← s∗θ or incrementally by gradient ascent
s ← ΠS[s+ α∇sUθ(s)]
where α is the learning rate and ΠS a projection back into S. We then update θ to
increase fairness by
θ ← ΠΘ[θ + βGθ(s)]
where β is a learning rate and ΠΘ a projection back into Θ. We then repeat and
alternate between the two gradient steps. This is just one (naive) suggestion how the
optimization problem could be solved. This naive algorithm may give satisfactory
approximate solutions on some problems.
In our student example, S is discrete, but we could try some integer relaxation.
For instance, we could represent selected students A as a binary vector s ∈ S :=
{0, 1}6 with si = 1 iff studenti ∈ A, then U(A) ≡ U(s) =
∑6
i=1 si U(studenti).
We could then expand S to the simplex {s ∈ R6 : si ≥ 0∀i ∧
∑6
i=1 si = 2}.
Unfortunately ∇s∇>s Uθ(s) ≡ 0, since Uθ(s) is linear in s, so the double gradient
algorithm above cannot be applied.
Multi-objective optimization and Pareto optimality [Mie08]. For linearly
parametrized objectives (and only for those), there is the following relation to
6All vectors are taken to be column vectors, including the gradient ∇, unless transposed by >.
7Differentiate ∇sUθ(s)|s=s∗θ ≡ 0 w.r.t. θ and solve for ∇θs∗θ, and plug this into ∇θF (s∗θ) =
∇θs∗>θ ·∇sF (s)|s=s∗θ .
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Pareto optimality: In multi-objective optimization one considers m > 1 objec-
tives U1, ..., Um : S → R over solution space S. A solution s ∈ S is called
Pareto optimal iff it is not dominated by any other s′ ∈ S in the sense of
¬∃s′ ∈ S : [∀j : Uj(s′) ≥ Uj(s) ∧ ∃j : Uj(s′) > Uj(s)]. The Pareto front
PF ⊆ S is the set of all Pareto optimal s ∈ S. All other s /∈ PF are clearly
sub-optimal. Consider now the weighted sum of utilities Uθ(s) :=
∑m
j=1 θjUj(s)
with θj > 0 ∀j (strict inequality is important here). It is easy to see that for
any θ > 0, s∗θ := arg maxs∈S Uθ(s) is Pareto optimal. The converse, that any
s ∈ PF is Uθ-optimal for some θ > 0 however is in general not true. It holds true
if {(U1(s), ..., Um(s)) : s ∈ S} is a convex set,8 but for a finite data sets S (e.g.
S = {A ⊆ P : |A| = k = 2}) in the student example) this is never convex.9 Lacking
a better term, let us call CPF := {s∗θ : θ > 0} the “convex” Pareto front.10 An s ∈ S
is called weakly Pareto optimal (WPF) iff ¬∃s′ ∈ S : [∀j : Uj(s′) > Uj(s)]. For fair
decision making, we are only interested in reasonable mixtures θ ∈ Θ ( (0;∞)m,
and the set Θ may not even be an axis-aligned hypercube. Therefore in general
{s∗θ∗} ( S∗Θ ( CPF ( PF ( WPF ( S
For instance, for our example one can show that all inclusions are strict (see Fig-
ure 2):
optimal Fair solution: s∗θ∗ = {Amy,Zac},
(Θ)-optimal solution set: S∗Θ = {s∗θ∗} ∪ {{Bob,Zac}},
convex Pareto front: CPF = S∗Θ ∪ {{Amy, Isa}, {Bob,Eve}},
Pareto front: PF = CPF ∪ {{Amy,Bob}, {Bob, Isa}, {Isa,Zac}},
weak Pareto front: WPF = PF ∪ {{Eve,Zac}},
solution space: S = WPF ∪ {{Amy,Eve}, {Bob,Eve}, {Max, ∗}}
Nevertheless, for linear mixtures one may use ideas from multi-objective optimiza-
tion and Pareto frontiers to narrow down the solution space to aid finding S∗Θ and
ultimately s∗θ∗ . Note though that this approach is limited to linear mixtures of ob-
jectives, but not generally parametrized objectives Uθ, and even Θ does not need to
be a (subset of a) vector space, so the connection to Pareto optimality is somewhat
weak.
8Or more generally if all points in this set lie on the boundary of its convex hull, which may or
may not be true for finite S.
9For instance if we admit k = 1 student in our example, then PF = {Amy, Bob, Isa, Zac} ( S
are Pareto optimal, but Isa is not Uθ-optimal for any θ > 0.
10CPF itself can of course not be convex, since S is not a vector space, but even UPF :=
{(U1(s), ..., Um(s)) : s ∈ CPF} is usually not convex, but all points in UPF lie on the boundary of
the convex hull of UPF.
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5 Discussion
Perfect fairness. I have demonstrated how to incorporate fairness as a secondary
optimization criterion without compromising solution quality by exploiting that
many real-life objectives cannot unambiguously be defined. It is important to note
that if there is a binary notion of perfect fairness, it may not be achievable with this
procedure (unlike in the simple example).
Controversial fairness. On the other hand, fairness is a notoriously contentious
notion [VR18]. In our example, should irrelevant birth factors be even taken into
account, i.e. included in the data? If so, then which ones and why? Gender? Skin
color? Eye color? Body height? Should any imbalance in the pool of applicants
be taken into account (not a problem in our example)? Given there are many
contradictory notions of fairness [Zho18, Sec.4.7], improving (presumed) fairness is
probably wiser than aiming for perfect fairness. Our approach does the former
without harming solution quality; even optimizing for controversial fairness notions
(e.g. demographic parity [Har16, ZVRG17]) becomes unproblematic.
I also assumed that there is no bias in the data, or at least this work did not
address this issue. While removing explicit attributes in the data regarded as irrele-
vant is easy, how to deal with implicit bias in the data is subject to ongoing research
[BS16, CWV+17]. One may argue that once data is debiased, there is no need for
secondary fairness criteria, but the former seems difficult to achieve or even know,
and further diversity arguments will probably always remain.
Non-unique objectives. Coming up with an appropriate parametrized objective
can itself be a challenge, but arguably this is a better/easier problem than to specify
a unique objective. Being forced to agree on a relative weighing of factors can be
arduous and the result may easily be determined by authority or whoever shouts
loudest rather than rationally by reason and deliberation. A range of objectives
seems easier to converge to. In the simplest case one could pool the proposed utility
functions of different experts, or better, start with a large parametrized class {Uθ},
e.g. any (non)linear combination of attributes, then choose Θ to be the convex hull
of expert choices θ1, θ2, θ3, .... One may lean towards a smaller range Θ if the fairness
criterion is controversial, or a larger range Θ if fairness is deemed crucial.
Uncertainty in data. Consider a selection problem of k items from a large(r)
population P = {x1, ..., xn} as in the example, where xi ∈ X was a student record,
n = 6 and k = 2. Assume some attributes such as IQ are missing or not precisely
known, which can be modeled as interval-valued or more generally set-valued at-
tributes. In this case, a student record becomes a set Xi ⊆ X, the data set becomes
P = X1 × ... × Xn, and P ∈ P is one (arbitrary) completion or choice or imputa-
tion of attributes.11 For each choice we can find the optimal solution and then the
11While in this notation P strictly speaking is an n-tupel, we will interpret P also as a set of
size n, so that A ⊆ P is well-defined.
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(supposedly) fairest choice:
A∗P := arg max|A|=k
UP (A) and P
∗ := arg max
P∈P
F (A∗P ) (5)
Despite the similarity in mathematical structure to the uncertain objective case
(Θ=̂P and θ=̂P ), there is a crucial difference which renders A∗P ∗ actually very biased
or unfair. Assume that naively using mean values for uncertain attributes leads
to a high proportion of male admissions. Using (5) instead may indeed lead to
more women being admitted, but inspecting P ∗ would reveal that this has been
achieved by imputing IQ and grades at the low interval boundary for males and at
the high interval end for women, which is difficult to justify as fair. To summarize:
Uncertainty in data is fundamentally different from uncertainty in the objective,
and procedure (5) does not lead to fair decisions.
6 Outlook
The basic proposed idea (possibly) can and needs to be extended in various ways: For
instance, I have not discussed stochastic uncertainty: The data could be stochastic,
and/or the evaluation of the objective may be stochastic.
Many problems involve a machine learning component to solve, so there could
be bias and uncertainty in the learned model.
Possibly the most important question is how much can fairness be increased by
expanding a single objective to a parametrized class, or more generally, how does
F (s∗θ) depend on Θ. This will heavily depend on the problem domain, primary
objective, the fairness criterion, the data, and how large a Θ can be well-justified
before it becomes an opportunity for rigging rather than fairness. To make theoret-
ical progress on this question, some structural assumptions on Uθ, Θ, and F have
to be made.
Finally, in order to obtain optimal fair solutions one has to solve a challenging
non-convex and non-continuous double-optimization problem over discrete choices
and continuous parameters.
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